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I. INTRODUCTION
Food and technology have had a long and tempestuous relationship.
Current methods of food production and processing in the industrialized
world depend heavily on technological developments. However, all
technologies are not created equal. Some can produce food that is safer, more
sustainable, more nutritious, or longer lasting.' Some can have the opposite
effect: increasing opportunities for adulteration,2 increasing the difficulty in
detecting food fraud,3 and contributing to both foreseeable and unforeseeable
health or ecological costs. 4 Increasingly sophisticated technologies often
* Ms. Schaefer is a J.D. candidate, May 2015, at the University of California at Los
Angeles, School of Law. Special thanks to Prof. Michael T. Roberts, Executive Director
of the Resnick Program for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law, whose
guidance made this comment possible. Lauren Bernadett, Associate at Somach Simmons
& Dunn, offered her invaluable perspective on the publishing process. Thanks also to
Margot Pollans, Teaching Fellow at the Resnick Program, and Prof. Daniel J. Bussel at
UCLA School of Law for their constructive comments on earlier drafts.
1. See, e.g., Y. MOTARJEMI ET AL., FOOD SAFETY ISSUES: FOOD TECHNOLOGIES AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 7 ( World Health Organization July 25, 1995), available at
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/fs management/en/foodtech.pdf (declaring
that food technology should be recognized as a health technology as well); ROYAL
SOCIETY NAMES REFRIGERATION MOST SIGNIFICANT INVENTION IN THE HISTORY OF
FOOD AND DRINK (Sept. 13, 2012), http://royalsociety.org/news/2012/top-20-food-
innovations/; Nadia Arumugam, Best Food Innovations of2012, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2012,
12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/2012/12/26/best-food-
innovations-of-2012/ (including in this list edible food packaging and drifting ocean fish
farms).
2. See, e.g., James Griffiths, 20, 000 Kilos of Fake Beef Seized in Xi 'an, SHANGHAIIST
(Sept. 14, 2013, 11:00 PM),
http://shanghaiist.com/2013/09/14/20000_kilos of fake beefseized in xian.php;
Patrick Boehler, Bad Eggs: Another Fake-Food Scandal Rocks China, TIME NEwSFEED
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/06/how-to-make-a-rotten-egg/.
3. See, e.g., Daniel Kelley, 5 Food Frauds You Might Have to Watch For, ESQUIRE
(Jun. 12, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/food-for-men/food-frauds-to-
watch-15574457; Shoshana Walter, Farm Fakes: A History of Fraudulent Food,
MODERN FARMER (May 3, 2013), http://modemfarmer.com/2013/05/farm-fakes-a-
history-of-fraudulent-food/.
4. See, e.g., Crystal Gammon and Environmental Health News, Weed-Whacking
Herbicide Proves Deadly to Human Cells, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 23, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=weed-whacking-herbicide-p;
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become less apparent to the average consumer. For example, consider
irradiated meat or genetically modified foods as opposed to freezer storage
or homogenization. Some food technologies, like freeze-drying, tend to
attract consumers.' Others, like meat from cloned animals, tend to elicit
negative reactions.6 This wide variety in applications of technology to food,
as well as the range of consumer responses, leaves industry stakeholders and
regulatory bodies with difficult choices concerning when and where to
involve consumers.
The astounding pace of technological innovation has outpaced
developments in consumer participation, resulting in consumer frustration
and an increasing sense of hostility between consumers on the one hand and
industry and regulators on the other.7 How can regulators and industry
stakeholders foster innovation without alienating consumers? How can they
develop and market innovative goods that consumers feel benefitted by?
How can these goals be met in a climate that is often presented in a reductive
binary: either technological innovation or transparency enabling consumer
preference?
This paper compares United States ("U.S.") and European Union
("EU") approaches to the intensifying questions surrounding technology in
the food industry. Juxtaposing the U.S. and EU is not meant to automatically
elevate one approach above another, but to highlight the range of choices
available. Through an evaluation of the role consumer concerns play in the
adoption of currently marketed innovative food technologies, this paper
shows that the developing field of nanotechnology presents an opportunity
for proponents of technology in the food industry. This paper argues that
regulators and industry stakeholders should embrace a conception of the
consumer as intelligent, thoughtful, and invested in the potential benefits of
technology. By acting on this view of consumers, regulators and the industry
can repair their relationships with consumers and build development and
regulatory protocols that serve all these groups better.
Maggie Koerth-Baker, Listeria Evolved to Live in Your Fridge, BOING BOING (May 5,
2011, 8:41 AM), http://boingboing.net/2011/05/05/listeria-evolved-to.html.
5. Steven Rinella, A Love Affair with Freeze-Dried Food, OUTSIDE (March 6, 2013),
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/culinary/A-Love-Affair-With-
Freeze-Dried-Food.html (noting a steady increase in consumer sales).
6. James Meikle, Public Strongly Against Cloned Animal Meat, Study Reveals,
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/jun/06/foodtech.food; Finlo Rohrer, What
are Attitudes to Clone Food in the US?, BBC (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada- 10871737.
7. See Elen Stokes, You Are What You Eat: Market Citizens and the Right to Know
About Nano Foods, 2 J. HUMAN RIGHTS ENV'T 178, 179-80 (2011).
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However, this paper suggests that industry stakeholders and regulators
should embrace consumer preference by increasing transparency and
involving consumers in key policymaking structures surrounding nanotech
and other developing food technologies. As significant stakeholders in the
food system, consumers should be educated, and their input should be
valued. Some evidence presented in this paper suggests this inclusion will
result in positive responses when a consumer benefit can be shown. If
consumers feel they are participants in the development of new food
technologies they are more likely to make calculated risks rather than
rejecting the technology out of hand.
This paper does not seek to suggest a value-or lack thereof-of
developing food technologies or to evaluate related scientific data. Rather, it
proposes better integration of consumers into the process of developing and
regulating new food technologies. This integration will, in turn, result in a
more transparent process that can benefit industry stakeholders as well as
consumers and regulators. As an analytic lens, this paper will compare
approaches by the U.S. and the EU, which have long been in tension and
have resulted in numerous international and bilateral trade disputes.
The analysis is structured as follows: this paper first discusses the
current role of consumers in developing and regulating new food
technologies, such as irradiation, artificial hormones, antibiotics, and
genetically engineered crops. Then follows a survey of the current state of
nanotechnology, which shows it is an area ripe for new approaches. The final
section suggests new avenues of promoting consumer engagement with
nanotech development, which can serve as a model for other developing food
technologies.
II. CURRENT CONSUMER RELATIONSHIP TO FOOD TECHNOLOGIES
A. Technological Development Drives Supply and Demand
Technology has served as the primary shaper of food supply and
demand throughout history, in a "boom and bust cycle". 8 For example, the
development of irrigation and plows increased production but also resulted
in erosion and soil infertility.9 These issues were addressed with the
development of crop rotation, cover crops, and manure-based fertilizers.'"
8. JOHNS HOPKINS CENTER FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, Teaching the Food System:
History of Food (last accessed Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter History of Food],
http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/teaching-the-food-
system/curriculum/_pdf/Historyof Food-Lesson.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Further increases in food production resulted in increases to the population,
which precipitated the need for additional production and catalyzed the
development of refrigeration, synthetic fertilizers, monocultures, and
significant food imports and exports." The industrialized food system relies
on economies of scale, and this incorporates the values of specialization,
simplification, routinization, mechanization, standardization, and
consolidation. 12
The current food system has resulted in minimal off-the-shelf costs for
many,' 3 but also increased tension between consumers and food producers.
Consumers are becoming more aware of marketing strategies aimed to get
them to pay the same amount of money for a less costly product, or for
products with little to no nutritional value.'4 The hidden cost of
externalities-like skyrocketing chronic diseases and increasing awareness
of environmental unsustainability of food production processes-and new
issues-like superweeds, antibiotic resistance, and arsenic in chicken-have
resulted in resurging consumer wariness of industry and regulator
assurances. 5 Increasing attention is being paid to the rise of consumer
distrust, which seems poised to increase as technology develops.' 6 Many
consumers feel current uses of technology in food are driven by profit,
without regard to their social, environmental, ethical, or health preferences. 7
Without a change in the way industry and regulators interact with
consumers, consumers will likely continue to see food technologies as
geared toward industry benefit rather than their own enrichment. This may
lead to increased consumer backlash and rejection of new technologies.
11. WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID EXCHANGE: How TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD
12-14 (2009).
12. History of Food, supra note 8, at 13-14; see also JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS,
AND STEEL 279 (1999).
13. Americans spend less than 9% of their incomes on groceries, almost a 30%
reduction compared to the early 80s. Lam Thuy Vo, What America Spends on Groceries,
NPR's PLANET MONEY (June 8, 2012, 10:37 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/06/08/154568945/what-america-spends-on-
groceries.
14. See, e.g., Michael Moss, The Extraordinary Science ofAddictive Junk Food, NY
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/magazine/the-
extraordinary-science-of-j unk-food.html.
15. See, e.g., Maria Lee, Risk and Beyond: EU Regulation of Nanotechnology, 35
EUR. L. REV. 799, 800, 816-18 (2010).
16. Stokes, supra note 7, at 178-79.
17. Americans Lack Trust in and Knowledge of Food Industry, Finds New FoodThink
White Paper, PR NEWSWIRE (March 19, 2013), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/americans-lack-trust-in-and-knowledge-of-food-industry-finds-new-foodthink-
white-paper-199063621 .html (noting that 81% of US consumers express distrust of the
food industry).
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To illustrate the current tensions, this paper will examine the reception
of several significant food technologies: irradiation, artificial hormones,
routine antibiotics in animal agriculture, and genetically engineered crops.
Each section will compare the responses of European Union and United
States industry and regulators.
1. Irradiation
Exposing food products to ionizing radiation kills pests, delays
ripening, and reduces some microbes; this extends shelf life and decreases
contamination."8 Originally used extensively on astronaut food, irradiation
did not expand into the consumer market until the 1980s. 19 While it is
considered safe within certain parameters by both the EU and U.S.,
consumers expressed concerns over whether approved doses would leave
irradiated food radioactive or alter nutrition, taste, or texture, as well as
whether manufacturers would use the technology as a substitute for sanitary
practices.' °
While U.S. consumers were initially wary, several studies suggested
educating them on the potential benefits of irradiation, especially in
comparison with the alternatives, would result in increased acceptance.2 1
While the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") now requires labeling of
some irradiated foods, it responded to consumer concerns by making it
harder to identify which foods were irradiated.22 In 1984, it originally
proposed no labeling requirement.23 In 1997, it decreased label visibility and
18. Food Irradiation, ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/sources/food irrad.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
19. Jo'zsef Farkasa and Csilla Moha'csi-Farkas, History and Future of Food
Irradiation, 22 TRENDS IN FOOD SCI. & TECH. 121, 122 (2011).
20. See e.g., Samuel S. Epstein and Wenonah Hauter, Preventing Pathogenic Food
Poisoning: Sanitation, Not Irradiation, 31 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 187 (2001); PUBLIC
CITIZEN, FOOD IRRADIATION AND GLOBAL TRADE: WHAT IRRADIATION MEANS FOR
FARMERS AND RANCHERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2003),
available at www.citizen.org/documents/tradereport.pdf.
21. Michael Boland and Sean Fox, Food Irradiation and Public Health, U. MINN.
FOOD POLICY RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 2012),
https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/157629/1/FPRCIssue%/20Brief IrradiationU
DC%202013.pdf.
22. FDA, Food Irradiation: What You Need to Know,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/ToolsMaterials/ucm216924.htm (last
updated Nov. 7, 2014).
23. WASHINGTON ASSOCIATED PRESS, FDA Proposes Softening Irradiated Food
Labels, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2007) [hereinafter FDA Proposes],
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-04-04-food-radiation N.htm.
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exempted disclosure of irradiated ingredients.24 In 2007, it proposed
allowing irradiated food labels to say "pasteurized" or "cold pasteurized"
instead of "treated by radiation" or "treated by irradiation."25 Further, the
FDA has rejected various requests for public hearings by consumer advocacy
organizations, while expanding approved uses of irradiation.
2 6
In the EU, the government responded to consumer concerns in 1999 by
permitting irradiation only where necessary, non-hazardous, beneficial to
consumers, labeled, and not replacing proper manufacturing practices.27 EU
rules also require inspection of irradiation facilities and devices.28 Member
states are allowed to further restrict or ban the practice as they see fit.29 These
different approaches have resulted in vastly different utilization of the
technology. In 2010, the U.S. irradiated over 100,000 tons of food, eleven
times the amount irradiated in the EU.3 °
2. Artificial Hormones in Meat Animals
Synthetically produced growth hormones sparked intense disagreement
between the European Union and the United States, including a World Trade
Organization ("WTO") dispute.3 These hormones are relatively inexpensive
in their artificial form and can increase producer profits significantly by
promoting rapid muscle and fat growth.32 However, they come at a cost.
Because treated cattle require more energy-dense feed to support this faster
growth, feed supplements began including meat and bone meal-a risk
24. Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115,
§ 306, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
25. FDA Proposes, supra note 23.
26. Irradiation in the Production, Processing, and Handling of Food, 76 Fed. Reg.
20509 (Apr. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 179); Peyton Ferrier, Irradiation of
Produce Imports: Small Inroads, Big Obstacles, USDA ERS (June 16, 2011),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/20 11-j une/irradiation-of-produce-imports.aspx.
27. Council Directive 1999/2, 1999 O.J. (L 66/16) (EC); Council Directive 1999/3,
art. 4, 1999 O.J. (L 66/24) (EC).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Tamikazu Kume and Setsuko Todoriki, Food Irradiation in Asia, the European
Union, and the United States: A Status Update, 62 RADIOISOTOPES 291 (2013). In the
European Union, the most common irradiated foods are frog parts, poultry, and spices;
in the US, spices, grains, fruits, and meats are routinely irradiated. Id. at 296-97.
31. Ladina Caduff, Growth Hormones and Beyond 1-2 (Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich, Working Paper No. 8-2002, Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.ib.ethz.ch/docs/working_papers/wp_2002_08.pdf.
32. Renee Johnson and Charles E. Hanrahan, The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf.
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factor for BSE ("Mad Cow Disease").33 Consumer concerns regarding these
hormones related not only to BSE, but also to cancer and reproductive harm
in humans3 4 and animal welfare.3 5 Europeans were particularly concerned
after several "hormone scandals," including the discovery of endocrine
disruptors in baby food from cattle fed hormone growth stimulants.3 6
U.S. consumers opposed to these hormones did not gain traction with
regulators, despite some support from the General Accounting Office
("GAO").3" The United States allows added growth hormones in cattle and
sheep production without labeling.38 While safe residue levels have been
established, a 2010 audit found the United States Department of
33. Judith Ferera, Environment: Mad Cows And Growth Hormones Part Of The Same
Problem, INTER PRESS SERVICE (March 25, 1996),
http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/03/environment-mad-cows-and-growth-hormones-part-
of-the-same-problem/.
34. See, e.g., SCI. COMMITTEE ON VETERINARY MEASURES RELATING TO PUB.
HEALTH, Assessment Of Potential Risks To Human Health From Hormone Residues In
Bovine Meat And Meat Products, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (April 30, 1999), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scv/out21 en.pdf.
35. Hormone use tends to correspond with industrialized CAFOs, which have a
reputation for inhumane animal treatment. See, e.g., What Are The Animal Welfare
Impacts of Using Hormone Growth Promotants in Beef Cattle?, RSPCA AUSTRALIA,
http://kb.rspca.org.au/What-are-the-animal-welfare-impacts-of-using-hormrone-growth-
promotants-in-beef-cattle_459.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2014).
36. TIM JOSLING, TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WTO 260 (James C. Hartigan, ed., 1st ed. 2009) ; RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT
AND TRADE 279 (Edith Weiss Brown, et al., eds., 2008); G.M. Fara et al., Epidemic of
Breast Enlargement in an Italian School, 2 LANCET 295 (1979).
37. See Samuel S. Epstein, None of Us Should Eat Extra Estrogen, LA TIMES (March
24, 1997), http://articles.latimes.com/1997-03-24/local/me-41521 1 hormone-levels;
Jayson L. Lusk and John A. Fox, Consumer Demand for Mandatory Labeling of Beef
from Cattle Administered Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn, 34 J.
Ag. & Applied Econ. 27 (2002), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/15506/1/34010027.pdf (finding that 85 percent
of respondents wanted mandatory labeling of beef produced with growth hormones);
GAO, RECOMBINANT BOVINE GROwTH HORMONE: FDA APPROVAL SHOULD BE
WITHHELD UNTIL THE MASTITIS ISSUE Is RESOLVED, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS (Aug. 6, 1992), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/216521 .pdf.
38. Steroid Hormone Implants Used for Growth in Food-Producing Animals,
FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/ProductSafetylnformation/ucm055
436.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2011).
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Agriculture's ("USDA") testing program inadequate to ensure compliance.
39
Recent efforts to improve that testing have yet to be evaluated for efficacy.
4
During the first BSE scare in the 1990s, the EU banned imported meat
from cows treated with these hormones.41 The U.S. disputed this action with
the WTO, which ruled against the EU and allowed punitive sanctions. 42 From
the WTO perspective, the EU was making rules that were more restrictive
than necessary to protect its citizens' health, and the policy was thus labeled
as hidden protectionism. 43 Similar clashes have erupted with the use of rBGH
in dairy cows 44 and a hormone-like drug called ractopamine in beef, pork,
and turkeys.45 While consumer concerns have not made much of a ripple
regarding U.S. policy, increasing trade resistance to the hormone-like drugs
recently prompted the USDA to implement a program labeling meats as
"Never Fed Beta Agonists," hoping these meats will find less trade
resistance.46
39. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT OF THE FSIS NATIONAL
RESIDUE PROGRAM FOR CATTLE (March 25, 2010).
40. See Helena Bottemiller, USDA to Ramp Up Drug Residue Testing for Meat and
Poultry, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 2, 2012),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/usda-to-ramp-up-drug-residue-testing-for-
meat-and-poultry/.
41. Hormones in Meat -Introduction, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/chemicalsafety/contaminants/hormones/index-en.htm
(last updated Dec. 4, 2007).
42. Johnson & Hanrahan, supra note 32.
43. Dispute Settlement: European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/casese/ds26_e.htm (last updated May 9,
2014).
44. Press Release, Consumer Policy Inst., U.S. and Europe Agree to Disagree on
Safety of Dairy Hormone (June 30, 1999), available at
http://consumersunion.org/news/u-s-and-europe-agree-to-disagree-on-safety-of-dairy-
hormone/.
45. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller, FDA Petitioned to Lower Ractopamine Limits for
Meat, Review Health Impacts, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/12/fda-petitioned-to-lower-ractopamine-limits-
for-meat-review-animal-health-impact/.
46. See Helena Bottemiller, Escalating Trade Dispute, Russia Bans Turkey Over
Ractopamine Residues, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/02/escalating-trade-dispute-russia-bans-turkey-
over-ractopamine-residues/; Cathy Siegner, USDA Introduces Certification Program for
Meat Without Growth-Enhancing Drugs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/new-usda-certification-program-may-
increase-exports-for-livestock-producers-who-dont-use-growth-enhancing-drugs/.
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3. Antibiotics in Animal Agriculture
During the middle of the previous century, studies found that
antibiotics could be used not only to treat sick animals, but also to prevent
diseases prevalent in the crowded industrial animal feed operations.
47
Somehow, these antibiotics also increase feed conversion efficiency,
resulting in ballooning use.48 Increased antibiotic use coincided with
consumer concerns surrounding antibiotic resistance, animal welfare, harm
from residues, and whether they would be substituted for sanitary conditions.
The FDA approved routine feed-based antibiotic use in the 1950s based
on these studies alone.4 9 Similar to growth hormones, antibiotics are subject
to residue limits and random testing.50 The FDA did not solicit public
comment regarding these approvals and waived regulations they could have
enforced to require a showing of safety regarding these new uses.5' After a
1969 United Kingdom ("UK") committee concluded that such uses
contributed to antibiotic resistance in humans, the FDA convened a task
force to address the issue.52 In 1977, it attempted to withdraw several
approvals, but was blocked by industry pressure.53 Industry representatives
claimed the FDA did not have sufficient scientific evidence of harm.54 A
1980 study from the National Academy of Sciences found that:
[E]xisting data could neither prove nor disprove the
postulated hazards to human health from subtherapeutic
antimicrobial use in animal feed. However, the report
cautioned that "[t]he lack of data linking human illness with
subtherapeutic levels of antimicrobials must not be equated
with proof that the proposed hazards do not exist. The
research necessary to establish and measure a definitive
47. Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and
Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2013).
48. Jd.at 1012.
49. Id. at 1010.
50. 21 C.F.R. § 556.1(a) (2010).
51. Heinzerling, supra note 47, at 1010.
52. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: The Judicious Use of Medically
Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals 5-6 (April 13, 2012),
available at
http://www. fda.gov/downloads/animalveterinary/guidancecomplianceenforcement/guid
anceforindustry/ucm216936.pdf.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 6-7.
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risk has not been conducted and, indeed, may not be
possible."55
The following three decades produced additional domestic and international
support for restricting sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in animals, including
recommendations from the GAO, World Health Organization ("WHO"), and
Codex Alimentarius,5 6 as well as consumer groups.57 Despite this, only 20%
of antibiotics used in the United States from 2009 to 2010 were used by
humans: over 70% were given in animal feed and water, with just 3%
injected therapeutically.58 The most recent attempts to address antibiotic
overuse have come in the form of voluntary measures, which some argue
will not be effective.59
The EU has responded to these realizations more quickly, but with
varied success, and still much more slowly than might have been expected.
For instance, in the 1990s, they banned selected antibiotics;6" they increased
the ban in 2006 to include all antibiotic use for growth promotion. 61As part
of the effort, the government also sponsors an annual EU Antibiotic
Awareness Day to draw attention to the importance of their careful use.62
However, these policies still allow antibiotic use for disease prevention,
which is administered the same way and in the same doses as for growth
promotion.63 Due to the allowances for disease-preventing antibiotics, actual
55. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
56. dat 8-14.
57. Helena Bottemiller, FDA Denies Petition to Ban Certain Antibiotics, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/201 1/11/fda-denies-
petition-to-ban-certain-antibiotics/.
58. Know The Facts About Antibiotic Resistance and Animal Agriculture, KEEP
ANTIBIOTICS WORKING (June 2012),
http://www.keepantibioticsworking.com/new/Library/UploadedFiles/KAW-brochureJ
une2012.pdf.
59. Lydia Zuraw, Will FDA's Voluntary Plan Actually Reduce Antibiotics in Animal
Feed?, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec., 12, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/12/fda-finalizes-guidance-for-phasing-out-
antibiotics-in-food-animals/.
60. The Antibiotic Ban in Denmark: A Case Study on Politically Driven Bans,
ANIMAL HEALTH INST., http://www.ahi.org/issues-advocacy/animal-anitbiotic-ban-in-
denmark-a-case-study-on-politically-driven-bans/. (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
61. Animal Nutrition - Feed Additives - Basic Legislation, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/foodlanimalnutrition/feedadditives/legislen.htm (last updated
June 23, 2008).
62. Press Release, European Commission, European Antibiotic Awareness Day
2013: Key Facts on the Fight Against Antimicrobial Resistance in the EU (Nov. 15,
2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO- 13-994 en.htm.
63. Dan Charles, Europe's Mixed Record on Animal Antibiotics, NPR'S THE SALT
(March 23, 2012, 4:53 PM),
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use varies.64 However, since the 90s, Denmark has successfully cut its use in
half.65 Even the Netherlands-which used comparable amounts to the U.S.-
is finally seeing a decrease.66
4. Genetically Engineered Crops
Compared to irradiation, hormones, and antibiotics, genetic
engineering ("GE") 67 presents a wider range of possible applications to
food-the combination of foreign genes that may be inserted into a base
crop's genetic code is almost endless. This carries with it a corresponding
breadth of potential concerns, including human safety, allergens,
environmental impact, cross breeding with conventional seeds, superweeds,
and increased monocultures and pesticide use. The few consumers
introduced to GE crops early in their development expressed enthusiasm for
their development, but wanted studies completed regarding the above
issues-and they opposed large-scale production. 68 They favored strict
regulation but did not trust agencies on their own-they wanted input from
public health officials, environmental groups, and taxpayers.69
In 1986, when biotechnology was in its infancy, the Reagan White
House developed the "Coordinated Framework"-assigning current laws
administered by the FDA, USDA, and the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to foods developed with biotechnology, on the assumption that they
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/03/23/149221287/europes-mixed-record-on-
animal-antibiotics.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. This term may be used to reference direct genetic manipulation using
biotechnology and includes what are commonly referred to as GMOs - genetically
modified organisms.
68. Alison Peck, Does Regulation Chill Democratic Deliberation? The Case of
GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 668 (2013) ("[A] majority of respondents supported
equal or increased government support for biotechnology research, and most supported
small-scale field tests. When asked about large-scale environmental releases (short of
commercial release), however, respondents were more skeptical: fifty-three percent said
firms should not be able to make such releases, even 'if the risks of environmental danger
are judged to be very small."') (citing Office of Tech. Assessment, New Developments
in Biotechnology: Public Perceptions of Biotechnology (May 1987), 83-84 & 87-88).
69. Id. at 668-69 ("When asked whether they would believe statements about the risk
of a biotech product from various groups, respondents were more inclined to believe
university scientists, public health officials, and environmental groups than federal
agencies.").
[VOL. 10
2014] LET'S STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE TRANSPARENCY 245
present no unique risks.7" These and other key decisions were implemented
without meaningful public input.7' Until a groundswell of public demand,
the FDA discouraged even most voluntary labeling as potentially confusing
and misleading.7 2 In 2011, the USDA fast-tracked approvals for new
strains,73 while 60% to 70% of foods other than fresh fruits and vegetables
used GE ingredients.74 Meanwhile, decades into the development and use of
GE crops, fewer than half of U.S. consumers knew about such products in
2013, and only one quarter believed they had eaten GE foods.7 5
Consumers who have learned about these foods are demanding
information but receiving intense industry opposition.76 Nearly half of
American states have introduced mandatory labeling proposals.7 7 Several
local governments are considering, or have already, banned or limited GE
70. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, Issues in the Regulation of
Genetically Engineered Plants andAnimals 1 (April 2004) [hereinafter PEW INITIATIVE],
http://www.pewhealth.org/uploadedFiles/PHG/ContentLevelPages/Reports/foodbio
tech regulation_0404.pdf.
71. Peck, supra note 68 (concluding that, "[T]he history of biotechnology
development and public awareness of that technology raises doubts as to whether the
public has had an opportunity to engage in meaningful democratic deliberation about
biotech controls."); see also PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 70, at 18, 86 (noting that FDA
processes have no minimum requirements for public participation and transparency;
many current GE foods are put on to market after voluntary, confidential consultations
between the agency and the product's developers).
72. Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering, FDA.GOV, available at
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation
/labelingnutrition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) ("A statement that a food
was not bioengineered or does not contain bioengineered ingredients may be misleading
if it implies that the labeled food is superior to foods that are not so labeled.").
73. Petition Process Improvements, USDA,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petproc imp.shtml (last modified March 5,
2012).
74. Maggie Caldwell, 5 Surprising Genetically Modified Foods, MOTHER JONES
(Aug. 5,2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/08/what-are-
gmos-and-why-should-i-care.
75. William K. Hallman et al., Public Perceptions of Labeling Genetically Modified
Foods 4 (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://humeco.rutgers.edu/documentsPDF/news/GMlabelingperceptions.pdf.
76. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, State Labeling Initiatives,
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-labeling-
initiatives (last accessed Dec. 21, 2013).
77. Id.
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crops, including Hawaii's Big Island,"8 several California counties,79 and the
City of Los Angeles.8" The industry spent millions of dollars to oppose
mandatory labeling in just two states and is aiming for a federal ban.8" To fill
the gap between industry and government reticence on the one hand and
consumer demand on the other, expensive niche retailers like Whole Foods
are developing private labeling requirements,82 leading to a sense that
transparency is, for many dependent on the U.S. food system, an
unaffordable luxury.
The EU countries first imported GE crops in 1996, near the height of
the BSE scandals that shattered public trust in government food regulators.8 3
Despite the opposition of consumer groups, environmental groups, and some
scientists, the EU originally approved fourteen GE plants and was poised to
approve thirteen more. 84 Member states, however, instituted their own bans
and called for biotech manufacturer liability legislation before they would
continue approvals or imports.8 U.S. crop containment failures in 2000 and
2005 further eroded confidence in the technology.86
In response, the EU adopted additional regulations, including the
Regulation on Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, which requires
labeling of many GE products.8" It also created the European Food Standards
Agency to conduct independent safety assessments.88 While the EU was
working to craft approval processes acceptable to member countries, the U.S.
78. Hawaii's Big Island Bans Biotech Companies & GMO Crops, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 19, 2013, 10:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/19/big-island-
bans-gmon 4305729.html.
79. Gabriela Pechlaner, GMO-Free America? Mendocino County and the Impact of
Local Level Resistance to the Agricultural Biotechnology Paradigm, 19 INT'L J. OF
SOC'Y OF AGRIC. & FOOD 445 (2012).
80. Los Angeles May Become Largest GMO-Free Area in the US, RT.COM (Oct. 24,
2013, 12:05 AM), http://rt.com/usa/los-angeles-gmo-ban-643/.
81. Stephanie Strom, Food Companies Claim Victory Against Labeling Initiative in
Washington State, NY TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), available at www.nytimes.com.
82. Stephanie Strom, Major Grocer to Label Foods With Gene-Modified Content, NY
TIMES (March 9, 2013), available at www.nytimes.com.
83. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. vs. EU: An Examination of
the Trade Issues Surrounding Genetically ModifiedFood, PEWTRUSTS.ORG 8 (Dec. 2005,
8),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food and Biotech
nology/BiotechUSEU 1205.pdf.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 28, 33.
87. Id. at 9.
88. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. V. EU, supra note 83, at 28.
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launched another trade dispute.89 The EU streamlined their approval process,
but still required labeling and traceability.9" A 2010 study indicates that 84%
of EU citizens had heard of GE foods and 61% felt their development should
not be encouraged, though these opinions vary from country to country.
91
While the EU has responded to international pressures to accept GE food
technologies,92 public concerns seem to have significantly influenced
approvals and use in the EU market.
93
B. Regulator and Industry Assumptions Regarding Consumers
The approaches of the U.S. and the EU, while different, are not an
exclusive binary. However, the divergence between the approaches
highlights the substance, causes, and effects of assumptions regarding
consumers. The U.S. focuses its food regulation on immediate food safety
concerns, rather than long-term effects or social or environmental concerns.
The FDA, which regulates about 80% of the U.S. food supply,94 has
repeatedly disclaimed responsibility for incorporating such concerns in its
regulations and guidance.95 For example, when refusing to incorporate U.S.
consumer comments regarding animal cloning in its policies, the FDA said,
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 13.
91. TNS OPINION & SOCIAL for the EUROPEAN COMM'N, SPECIAL EUROBAROMERTER
73.1: BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 13-32 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter EUROBAROMETER],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs 341 en.pdf.
92. For example, the EU has required member states to drop wholesale bans on GE
products. EU Tells Serbia to Drop GMO Ban in Order to Join WTO, B92.NET (Oct. 17,
2013),
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/business.php?yyyy-2013&mm=l 0&dd=l 7&nav id=880
36.
93. Today, ninety GE crop varieties can be grown in and exported from the U.S.,
while only two are approved for cultivation in the EU, with thirty-nine approved as
imports. Gemma Masip et al., Paradoxical EU Agricultural Policies on Genetically
Engineered Crops, 18 TRENDS IN PLANT SCIENCE 312, 320 (2013). Some studies suggest,
though, that consumers do not actively avoid foods containing GE ingredients to the
degree predicted. Susanne Sleenhoff and Patricia Osseweijer, Consumer Choice: Linking
Consumer Intentions to Actual Purchase of GM Labeled Food Products, 4 GM CROPS
AND FOOD: BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD CHAIN 166 (2013).
94. FDA Facts: Food Safety Modernization Act, FDA (May 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FactSheets/UCM305765.pdf.
95. See generally U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA'S RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENT
ON THE ANIMAL CLONING RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY 5 (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm055491 .htm.
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The agency is not charged with addressing non-science
based concerns such as the moral, religious, or ethical issues
associated with animal cloning for agricultural purposes, the
economic impact of products being released in commerce,
or other social issues unrelated to FDA's public health
mission.
96
In the U.S., the focus is thus on public health, or food safety. The Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act provided the FDA with the additional mandate
of providing nutrition and other labeling. 97 This facilitates some consumer
ability to make choices between foods, but only foods that the FDA has
decided are materially different.98
Public interest groups-such as the Center for Science in the Public
Interest, Public Citizen, and the Consumer Federation-cooperate with other
consumer groups on an international level, but do not have a formalized
association with either the FDA or Congress. Their input must be given
either in the form of lobbying, lawsuits, or the general public comment
process, which is not available until a ruling is already in draft stage and the
industry concerned has already been extensively consulted. 99 FDA officials
often are hired after working at a high level in a food or drug manufacturing
business.' 0 This structure allows for consumer input only at the last
moments of rule-making. Further, it results in a FDA that is more versed in
the perspective of the business than the perspective of the consumer.
In contrast, EU food regulations consciously respond to consumer
concerns. The European Commission has noted a need for increased
consumer education and involvement in order to increase confidence in the
market.0 1 In fact, citing the increased responsibility placed on consumers by
market liberalization, it developed a comprehensive strategy that includes
96. Id.
97. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (1990).
98. Id.
99. Comment on Proposed Regulations and Submit Petitions, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/Regulatorylnformation/Dockets/Comments/default.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2014).
100. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507 (2013) (discussing the crossover between public agency and private industry
employees).
101. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A European
Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth, at 9 COM (2012) 132 final (May
22, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/consumer agenda 2012 en.pdf.
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consumer education even during compulsory schooling years.1"2 EFSA
("European Food Safety Authority"), an EU analogue to the FDA, -oversees
food safety.10 3 In order to allow EFSA to assess and monitor how consumers
perceive it, EFSA also carries out research among its key target audiences,
performing routine assessments to see whether it is meeting its further goal
of "communication and dialogue" to "reinforce confidence and trust in
EFSA and the EU food safety system through effective risk communications
and dialogue with partners and stakeholders.
' 10 4
Consumer groups in the EU also benefit from formalized connections
to the government. For instance, the European Consumer Organization
("BEUC") lobbies EU decision-making bodies on behalf of independent
consumer groups throughout Europe."0 5 A significant part of their funding
comes from an EU grant for consumer organizations.10 6 Perhaps even more
significant is the European Consumer Consultative Group ("ECCG"), which
was created by the European Commission to advise it on consumer issues
and disseminate information to consumer groups.'0 7 To preserve the group's
integrity, only individuals independent of both industry and government may
serve on the ECCG. 108 The divergent consumer input structures between the
U.S. and the EU mirror the differences between how these governments have
dealt with developing food technologies.
102. Commission Staff Working Document on Knowledge-Enhancing Aspects of
Consumer Empowerment, at 17 COM (2012) 235 final (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter
Consumer Empowerment], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/commission-staff working-knowledge-en
hancing_2012 2014_en.pdf.
103. European Food Safety Authority, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/agencies/regulatoryagencies bodies/policyagencies/efsa/index en.htm
(last accessed Dec. 18, 2013).
104. Who We Work With, EFSA,
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa/efsapartners.htm (last accessed Nov. 20, 2014).
105. Who We Are, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/who-we-are (last accessed
Nov. 20, 2014).
106. How are We Financed?, BEUC, http://www.beuc.org/about-beuc/financial-
information (last accessed Nov. 20, 2014).
107. European Consumer Consultative Group, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/eccgen.htm (last accessed Dec. 19,
2013).
108. European Consumer Consultative Group, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/consumers/protection of consumers/coOO10_e
n.htm (last accessed Dec. 19, 2013).
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1. Issues Raised
In the preceding illustrations, several issues emerge as central to
decisions of when and how to respond to consumer concerns: (1) distinctions
between process and product, (2) a right to know what one eats, (3) free trade
concerns, and (4) science-based regulation. The following sections address
those issues.
a. Process vs. Product
Product information relates to a good as received by the consumer. An
example of a product-related disclosure would be nutrition information: if a
granola bar contains 3 grams of fiber, this is so regardless of the machines
used to make it, the company's labor practices, or the types of pesticides used
to grow the ingredients. Process information, on the other hand, addresses
how the product got to be the way it is: Did its production harm workers,
animals, or the environment? Is there a difference between this good and
another one that appears identical? Examples of process information include
organic, fair trade, and dolphin-safe labels.
The process/product distinction features prominently in international
trade negotiations and U.S. food labeling regulation.° 9 In international trade,
process-based distinctions are viewed as suspicious, disguised protectionism
rather than responses to legitimate market needs.110 Under WTO rules,
process-based measures elicit stricter scrutiny and require more justification
than product-based measures." U.S. rule makers have relied on this
distinction when dismissing consumer wishes for more information.112 U.S.
industry groups have developed free-speech legal arguments by
distinguishing process information as less substantial than product
information." 3 On the one hand, they argue that mandatory process
disclosures are not justified by consumer interest; on the other, they claim
109. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences For Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540 (2004).
110. Id at 545.
111. Id. at 545-47.
112. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of
Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 431 (2002)
("[B]iotechnology should not be regulated as a process, but rather that the products of
biotechnology should be regulated in the same way as products of other technologies.")
(quoting NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 25 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Kysar, supra note 109, at 569. For further explanation, see the section on
consumers' right to know. pg. 24 et seq.
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that their own voluntary process-related disclosures should be exempt from
the advertising regulations that apply to product-related information. 114
Critics say the process/product distinction is artificial, reductionist, and
difficult to apply." 5 Supporters claim the distinction protects consumers
hampered by information limitations and naYvet6." 6 In practice, the
process/product distinction can function to restrict information, adding to
problems of consumer confusion or lack of knowledge rather than solving
them."' "Natural" food labels provide a prime example. A majority of
Americans look for the label "natural" when they shop." 8 Most believe such
food is produced without pesticides, herbicides, genetic engineering, or
artificial ingredients. "9 Many further believe that a food labeled "natural" is
closer to these ideals than one labeled "organic."' 2° However, the FDA has
not defined the term "natural" and only offers voluntary guidance for its
use. 2 ' The past two years have seen over one hundred false advertising
lawsuits over "natural" claims alone.'22 Some, like PepsiCo's Naked Juice,
reached multi-million dollar settlements.'23 Public interest groups like the
114. Id.
115. Id.at 540.
116. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 641. ("This process/product distinction has been invoked to question the
authority of an importing nation to ban or label products that are developed using
processes deemed objectionable by its citizens; to rationalize ignoring overwhelming
consumer support for mandatory labeling of food products that contain genetically
engineered ingredients; and to narrow the constitutional conditions under which states
may force manufacturers to disclose process information or to face legal challenges for
disclosing false or misleading process information. These efforts to restrict the
informational environment of consumers exist uncomfortably within a global political
climate that increasingly embraces market liberalism and the rhetoric of consumer
choice as its fundamental guideposts.") (emphasis added).
118. Mike Esterl, Some Food Companies Ditch "Natural" Label, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014240527023044705045791639337323670
84.
119. What Does "Natural" Mean?, PCC SOUND CONSUMER (Oct. 2011),
http://www.pccnaturalmarkets.com/sc/1110/natural.html.
120. Id.
121. FDA, What is the Meaning of "Natural" on the Label of Food?, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparency/basics/ucm214868.htm (last updated May 8,
2014) ("From a food science perspective, it is difficult to define a food product that is
'natural' because the food has probably been processed and is no longer the product of
the earth. That said, FDA has not developed a definition for use of the term natural or its
derivatives. However, the agency has not objected to the use of the term if the food does
not contain added color, artificial flavors, or synthetic substances.").
122. Esterl, supra note 118.
123. Rachel Tepper, Naked Juice Class Action Lawsuit Settlement Over Health Claims
Means $9 Million For Consumers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2013, 12:31 PM),
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Center for Science in the Public Interest see these labels as deliberate
deception: "There's a boatload of litigation and that is going to continue until
companies stop conning people. ' 24 Such situations fuel consumer
perceptions that the industry uses misleading process-related information to
capitalize on consumer values without addressing their concerns.125
b. Right to Know
Consumer claims that they have, at minimum, a "right to know" what
is in their food have followed closely on the heels of disclosures of
previously hidden technologies in food production. The concept of a right to
know has embedded itself in the American consciousness through its ties to
freedom of the press, government transparency, workplace safety,
carcinogen disclosure, and even consumer concerns about garment
sweatshops. 26 "The consumer right to know can be characterized as 'the
notion that the public has a basic right to know any fact it deems important
about a food or a commodity before being forced to make a purchasing
decision. '127
Many NGOs ("Non-Governmental Organizations") and consumer
groups support recognition of such a right, but the EU is one of the only
governments to have endorsed such a policy with regard to food. 128 While
the right to know carries great rhetorical power, its legal force in U.S. food
regulation is all but eviscerated. Right-to-know food-labeling legislation has
repeatedly failed in Congress.1 29 Courts have framed the right to know as
"mere consumer curiosity" in conflict with producers' free speech rights.' 30
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/28/naked-juice-class-action-
lawsuit n 3830437.html.
124. Esterl, supra note 118.
125. See also Aurora Paulsen, Catching Sight of Credence Attributes: Compelling
Production Method Disclosures on Eggs, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 280, 281-82
(2011) (concluding that failure to regulate process disclosures on egg cartons results in
consumer deception and premium prices paid for eggs with bucolic images that imply a
higher quality of product than the consumer receives).
126. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer's Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of
Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 301 (2006).
127. Id. at 302.
128. Id. at 292.
129. ld. at 293.
130. Alliance for Biolntegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 179 (D.D.C. 2000);
Keane, supra note 126, at 314 ("[A]lthough the right to know concept theoretically
factors into the legal analysis of food labeling, in reality, it is only relevant once a
significant safety issue has been established."); Sally Noxon Vecchiarelli, Mandatory
Labeling Of Genetically Engineered Food: Constitutionally, You Do Not Have a Right
to Know, 22 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 215, 222 (2013).
[VOL. 10
2014] LET'S STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE TRANSPARENCY 253
Litigation surrounding labeling milk from cows administered production-
increasing hormones ("rBST") resulted in holdings that limit a consumer's
right to know to "material" product differences that have been shown as a
possible cause of significant harm to the consumer. 3' Note, however, that
some producers have used a similar analysis to fend off attempted voluntary
labeling prohibitions 13 2 and some reasoning suggests even slight
compositional differences in products may provide a legal foothold for
consumer interest.]
33
On the other hand, the EU embraced a consumer right to know at the
community's inception. While some European commentators suggest
bolstering industry rights via international treaties, modeling the arguments
on the, U.S. industry's use of the Constitution, 34 EU consumers' political
power has increased rather than waned:
Legal support for the regulations is found in the 1997
Amsterdam Treaty, which expressly promotes the right to
consumer information as separate and distinct from health
and safety interests. From a political standpoint, European
food scares from the late 1990s have affected the public
consciousness about food safety such that the demand for
information about non-traditional foods cannot go
unanswered without political ramifications.' 35
131. Keane, supra note 126, at 306 ("A fair interpretation of Stauber and Alliance, at
least with respect to food labeling, is that consumers only have a right to know what
could harm them. However, even when a colorable likelihood of harm can be established,
the right to know turns out to be a rebuttable right.").
132. See Laurie J. Beyranevand, Milking It: Reconsidering the FDA's Refusal to
Require Labeling of Dairy Products Produced From rBST Treated Cows in Light of
International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 102, 113
(2012). Some argue that there is no right to food choice at all, much less a right to know
what you are eating. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 ME. L. REV.
738, 744 (2013) (positing a right against forced consumption of any particular food).
133. Beyranevand, supra note 133, at 133-34; see also Paulsen, supra note 125, at 313-
15.
134. Bernd van der Meulen and Eva van der Zee, "Through the Wine Gate": First
Steps Towards Human Rights Awareness in EU Food (Labelling) Law, 8 EUR. FOOD &
FEED L. REV. 41, 45-6 (2013) (advocating EU application of international human rights
treaties to grant businesses "freedom of expression," analogous to the freedom of speech
enjoyed by corporations in the United States). While US court rulings on corporate legal
personhood paved the way for US industry legal arguments, it is unclear how the author
envisions corporations could qualify as humans deserving of universal rights.
135. Keane, supra note 126, at 292.
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Where food scares in the U.S. have been brushed aside after official
assertions of safety, similar issues galvanized EU consumers, leading to the
development of EFSA and the Novel Foods Regulation.136 However, even
with these protections, concerns linger regarding regulatory gaps, trade
disputes, how EU rules will apply to new technologies, and whether current
rules offer true choice to consumers. 37
c. Free Trade
While U.S. consumers believe increased international trade is
beneficial, 38 one encounters little discussion of the impact its rules have on
domestic consumers. International trade rules focus on free trade as a way to
increase efficiency and thus increase overall output and wealth; each area
should focus on its specialties, which will result in increased efficiency from
economies of scale.'39 Increased export profits will then enable the purchase
136. See Lizette Alvarez, Consumers in Europe Resist Gene-Altered Foods, NY TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2003, at A3. Such food scares led directly to the formation of EFSA and the
implementation of the Novel Foods Regulation. EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY,
About EFSA, EFSA, http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2006); Alison Ma, Technology. Against the Grain. Controversy Around New
Genetically-Modified Crops May Have Caught Biotech Companies by Surprise, FIN.
TIMES MANDATE, Oct. 15, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 4261839; Q&A on the Novel
Foods Regulation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NEWS, (March 29, 2011, 11:31 AM),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20101019BKG88150/html/QA-on-the-novel-foods-regulation. Some
have expressed concerns that the Novel Foods Regulation unfairly prejudices products
from developing nations. Anu Liihteenmdiki-Uutela, European Novel Food Legislation
as a Restriction to Trade, Oct. 25, 2007, available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.eduIbitstream/7909/l/pp07la01.pdf.
137. Stokes, supra note 7.
138. AMERICA 'S PLACE IN THE WoRLD 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 3, 2013),
available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-3-13%20APW%20VI%20release.pdf.
139. Some argue that free trade in staple foods is the answer to world hunger, a view
echoed by the 1986 US Agriculture Secretary: "[The] idea that developing countries
should feed themselves is an anachronism from a bygone era. They could better ensure
their food security by relying on US agricultural products, which are available, in most
cases at much lower cost." Philip McMichael, The Impact of Globalisation, Free Trade
and Technology on Food and Nutrition in the New Millennium, 60 PROC. NUTR. SOC.
215, 219 (2001). Others see this increase in trade of foodstuffs as problematic for its
consequences of raising food prices. See, e.g., Jim Harkness, Free Trade Versus Food
Democracy, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (April 16, 2013, 5:20 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/294179-free-trade-versus-food-
democracy.
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of goods not produced domestically. Free trade aims to lessen and eventually
eliminate restrictions on the sale of goods between different areas.
140
Trade restrictions can be direct or indirect. Financial levies like tariffs
that directly increase the price of an imported item are direct. However,
labeling and other production requirements-such as the EU measures
regarding hormones and genetic engineering-have been challenged
internationally through the WTO as indirect restrictions on trade.14 1 Such
measures are not trade restrictions on their face, but could have that effect.
For example, some WTO members argued that the U.S.'s recently proposed
Country of Origin Labels ("COOL") lowered the value of their imported
goods, because consumers automatically prefer domestic products. 1
42
Each country proposing such regulations cites a specific internal,
arguably consumer-oriented, rationale: EU member countries worried that
allowing cultivation of genetically engineered crops without a robust liability
structure in place would leave them unable to hold producers accountable for
environmental or health harms that may later be discovered. Similarly, they
expressed concerns over hormone use linked to BSE, cancer, and
reproductive defects. 43 U.S. regulators claimed COOL would increase
traceability in the event of safety issues and bring processed meats in line
with labeling requirements for other goods. 
44
Each of these measures may also have some market influence. If these
measures have such an effect, those who stand to profit will support them as
well. While looking at who stands to gain from a policy can provide helpful
information, automatically treating any market-influencing measure as
suspect greatly increases the difficulty a country faces when implementing
consumer wishes and addressing their concerns. Some free trade
commentators have criticized this tendency, claiming that the goal should
not be eliminating trade barriers per se: "Policymakers must realize that the
objective is not simply a matter of removing barriers to trade, but promoting
140. For a list of trade barrier examples see Trade Barriers, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/barrierscrossTables.htm (last updated Nov. 28, 2013).
141. See, e.g., Labelling, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/envire/labellinge.htm (last accessed Dec. 22,
2013).
142. Vilsack: Let WTO Resolve Country-of-Origin Labeling, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Nov., 15, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/vilsack-let-wto-resolve-
country-of-origin-labeling/; Remy Jurenas and Joel L. Greene, Country-of-Origin
Labeling for Foods and the WTO Trade Dispute on Meat Labeling, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., Sept. 16, 2013, at 14-15.
143. See generally Harkness, supra note 139.
144. See Jurenas & Greene, supra note 142.
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trade in a way that would benefit the public."'' 45 Without tethering free trade
discussions to the public good, the rules look like little more than political
and industrial battering rams.
Free trade arguments have also appeared in U.S. domestic spats, but
have lain dormant for several decades. 146 One Iowa Representative revived
them during recent Farm Bill debates when he proposed that Congress
interpret the Commerce Clause to mean that states cannot regulate interstate
trade based on the means of production. 47 While this amendment was
targeted specifically at state-level animal welfare laws-including a recent
California law requiring that all eggs sold within its borders be produced by
hens in humane facilities by 2015-it could also have put into effect a lowest
common denominator rule for food safety and seed quality standards, as well
as for state-level labeling requirements. 148 Proponents argued the amendment
should pass to increase choice and lower prices for consumers, 149 while
opponents claimed that it would impermissibly nullify choices that a state's
citizens have made for themselves about the kinds of products they want to
buy. 5° Similar discussions have taken place among EU member states,
particularly Germany, France, and the UK.'
5'
145. Debra M. Strauss, The Application Of TRIPs To GMOs: International Intellectual
Property Rights And Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT'L L. 287, 319; Keane, supra note
126, at 301.
146. See generally, Paul T. Truitt, Interstate Trade Barriers in the United States,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (1941), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol8/iss2/2; Steven G. Craig and Joel W. Sailors,
Interstate Trade Barriers and the Constitution, 6 CATO J. 819 (1987), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journa1/1 987/1/cj6n3-6.pdf.
Federal bodies rarely mediate interstate trade disputes, but a few cases have been decided
at the Supreme Court level. David R. Francis, A War Between the States. Home-Grown
US Trade Barriers Costly, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 20, 1984),
http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0920/092015.html.
147. Steve King, The Protect Interstate Commerce Act Offers State Trade Solution,
BEEF USA, http://www.beefusa.org/ourviewscolumns.aspx?newsid=2620 (last accessed
Dec. 22, 2013).
148. Lauren Bemadett, Proposed King Amendment Threatens Broad Spectrum of Food
Issues, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/11/proposed-king-amendment-threatens-broad-
spectrum-of-food-issues/.
149. King, supra note 147.
150. Anne Lieberman, King Amendment to House Farm Bill Ignores Consumer
Trends, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (June 20, 2013, 7:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/306637-king-amendment-to-
house-farm-bill-ignores-consumer-trends.
151. Natalie Chen and Dennis Novy, Many Trade Barriers Remain High in the EU,
Vox (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/article/zero-tariffs-and-high-trade-costs-eu-
technical-barriers-trade; UNICE INTERNAL MARKET WORKING GROUP, It's the Internal
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d. Science-Based Regulation
The approach dubbed "science-based regulation" requires proof of
actual harm in order to place limitations on a product or process. This
principle appears within WTO mechanisms and U.S. food and agriculture
policies. In the abstract, it sounds undeniable that this would provide a
needed, objective standard against which to make international and domestic
rules. However, it assumes a product or process is safe until shown
otherwise. This means the burden is on those concerned about the product,
those who may not have enough evidence of long-term harm until after a
product has been widely distributed. With food, unless the harm is acute and
immediate, proof of harm will likely not be possible until the product has
been distributed and consumed for some time.
Many contrast science-based regulation with the precautionary
principle, which requires proof of safety before distribution if there is a
significant risk. EU regulations tend to favor this approach, which places the
burden on the producer or promoter of the product. While both approaches
lie on a spectrum and both have benefits and drawbacks, this juxtaposition
shows why the food industry tends to favor the science-based approach: it
requires less investment and effort up-front, lowers costs, increases market
opportunities, increases market certainty, and exculpates them from liability
for unforeseen consequences. 52
Juxtaposing the burdens of each approach also shows why consumers
tend to favor the precautionary approach: it requires that innovations are
affirmatively shown to be safe before they are widely disseminated; it
protects consumers from the effects of possibly detrimental technologies;
and it gives consumers confidence that the long-term effects of new
technologies have been taken into account. Because both approaches take
into account scientific findings, the nomenclature may be somewhat
misleading. "Ultimately, this is much less a discussion [] about whose
approach is more 'science-based' than it is about establishing the right time
Market, Stupid! A Company Survey on Trade Barriers in the European Union, UNICE 8
(May, 25, 2004),
http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/multimedia/archive/00000/A companysurveyon tr
_375a.pdf. Assertions of national sovereignty in analogy to states' rights in the WTO
have been rebutted by the consensual nature of the relationships. See CLAUDE E.
BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2002).
152. See e.g., Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, NY TIMES (Oct. 25, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/25/magazine/playing-god-in-the-garden.html
("Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food. Our interest is in
selling as much of it as possible. Assuring its safety is the FDA's job.") (quoting Philip
Angell, Monsanto's director of corporate communications).
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to act to prevent harm in the process of accumulating evidence, and how to
make manageable that point of action, be it early or late." '153
Proponents tout science-based regulation as a filter that will sort out
necessary measures from those based on unpredictable and varying social
values. Social values, or consumer preferences, are suspect. They should not
provide a basis for regulation, or even discrimination, because they could
unnecessarily hamper economic vitality and can fluctuate. Industries should
be allowed to develop and sell commodities without interference, unless
there is significant and undeniable justification.
Recent scuffles over ractopamine, a drug that mimics the function of
stress hormones in the bodies of animals that will be used for meat,
exemplify objectivity concerns. 54 Producers like this drug because it causes
more efficient conversion of feed to lean muscle weight, lowering the cost
to produce each pound of meat. 55 Sources say it is fed to 60% to 80% of
pork-producing pigs in the U.S. 56 Consumer organizations and some
governments, including the EU, oppose its use as a potential public health
hazard and on animal welfare grounds.157 In 2012, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, whose standards are recognized by the WTO as a basis for
trade disputes, placed the ractopamine bans of the EU, China, Taiwan, and
Russia on unstable footing by setting maximum residue levels. 58 The sixty-
nine to sixty-seven vote called into question the decision's objectivity and
sound scientific basis. 59 Additionally, Codex used to adopt measures by
consensus; resorting to votes on contentious issues leads to further lessening
of confidence. 1
60
153. Arguing about nothing? "Science-based" regulation of endocrine disruptors,
HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT (Jul. 21, 2013),
http://healthandenvironmentonline.com/2013/07/21/arguing-about-nothing-science-
based-regulation-of-endocrine-disruptors/.
154. See, e.g., Ractopamine Fact Sheet, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Feb. 2013),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/ractopamine factsheet 02211 .pdf.
155. Burt Rutherford, Codex Commission Adopts Global Standards For Ractopamine
Hydrochloride, BEEF (July 5, 2012), http://beefmagazine.com/health/codex-
commission-adopts-global-standards-ractopamine-hydrochloride.
156. Helena Bottemiller, Dispute over Drug in Feed Limiting US Meat Exports, FOOD
& ENV'T REPORTING NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.thefem.org/2012/01/dispute-over-drug-in-feed-limiting-u-s-meat-exports/.
157. Ractopamine Fact Sheet, supra note 154.
158. Helena Bottemiller, Codex Adopts Ractopamine Limits for Beef and Pork, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (July 6, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/07/codex-votes-69-
67-to-advance-ractopamine-limits-for-beef-and-pork/.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Industry groups are also influencing such scientific bodies. 16' Many
science-based regulations and standards depend not on independent findings
but on assessments provided by industry stakeholders themselves. 62 In
addition to conflict of interest concerns, they also often omit costly human
studies. 63 If a country or agency wants to set higher standards, that is seen
as protectionism, rather than warranted caution.
These concerns have also surfaced regarding the FDA, which primarily
evaluates evidence offered to it from other sources."64 Similar concerns have
been lcvied against EFSA. 165 Industry groups may also use the science-based
regulation principle to naysay consumer choices based on criteria like
environmental concerns or corporate control of foods by labeling these
consumers as anti-science, or anti-technology. 1
66
2. Assumptions
a. What They Are
i. U.S. Consumers should Accept Goods that Meet Minimum Standards
Addressing consumer discomfort with the current relationship of food
and technology requires an evaluation of the assumptions behind current
161. Kuei-Jung Ni, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to Problematic
International Standard-Making, 68 Food & Drug L.J. 97, 97 (2013).
162. MARJELLE D. MASSON-MATTHEE, THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION AND
ITS STANDARDS 68 (2007).
163. European Food Safety Authority, Safety Evaluation of Ractopamine: Scientific
Opinion of the Panel on Additives and Products or Substances Used in Animal Feed,
1041 EFSA J. 1, 24, 28 (2009), available at
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajoumal/pub/1041.htm.
164. See, e.g., Ramona Bashshur, FDA and Regulation of GMOs, ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE (Feb. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba -health -esource- home
/aba health lawesource_1302_bashshur.html; Do Seed Companies Control GM Crop
Research?, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-seed-companies-control-gm-
crop-research.
165. Martin Banks, EFSA's Anniversary Hit by Protest over "Industry Capture" of
Food Safety, PARLIAMENT (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.theparliament.com/latest-
news/article/newsarticle/efsas-anniversary-hit-by-protest-over-industry-capture-of-
food-safety/.
166. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, Looking Behind the Curtain. The
Growth of Trade Barriers that Ignore Sound Science, NFTC.ORG (May 2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/forums e/ngoe/posp47 nftc looking behind e.pdf.
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policies. Based on the illustrative technologies and themes evaluated so far,
the U.S. and EU seem to ascribe different functions and capabilities to
consumers. U.S. policies allow choices among products that have met
official minimum standards, but do not facilitate choices that look behind or
second-guess these thresholds. This seems to imply that consumers have a
low level of sophistication when choosing foods: they could not understand
the issues at play even if they received the information. Further, consumers
who wish to coordinate their social values with their food choices must
purchase specialty products, the labeling and regulation of which has caused
its own confusion and tensions. Industry groups have argued voluntary
informational labeling itself is misleading without an acute safety threat. 167
The FDA has discounted concerns through suggested disclaimers, such as
the one on rBST free milk: "No significant difference has been shown
between milk derived from rBST-treated and non-rBST treated cows.
1 68
The use of the word "significant" here simply denotes immediate health
effects. While consumers have a limited right to knowledge about their food,
consumer choices that conflict with FDA minimum standards are tolerated
at best. At worst-as with GE foods-such choices are intentionally
frustrated, after being labeled irrational, reactionary, or anti-science.
ii. EU Consumers should Use their Purchasing Power to Make Social
Choices
EU policies emphasize consumer education; they imply that consumers
can and should make informed, intelligent choices. 169 The EU consumer
empowerment plan specifically notes the importance of consumer education
and choice in an increasingly global economy:
The growing emphasis in policy-making on the freedom and
responsibility of consumers to make their own informed
choices means that consumer education is seen as a key tool
in ensuring the smooth operation of markets. However, the
167. See, e.g., Letter from FTC to Monsanto (April 21, 2007), available at
http://milk.procon.org/sourcefiles/FTC-to-monsanto.pdf.
168. Id.
169. See generally Stokes, supra note 7 (asserting the growing need for EU structures
to support these choices). Some say that retailers make the choices, not consumers, so
consumers have only an indirect choice based on what retailers believe that they want.
See, e.g., Colin A. Carter and Guillaume P. Gruere, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically
Modified Foods: Does it Really Provide Consumer Choice?, 6 AGBIOFORuM 2003, at
68, available at http://www.agbioforum.org/v6nl2/v6nl2al3-carter.pdf (last visited
Nov. 21, 2014).
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development of consumer education practices, in formal or
non-formal education, appears in most countries not to
reflect this shift in emphasis. 7°
Further, EFSA's goal to increase consumer confidence in the EU food
system acknowledges that regulators must work to deserve consumer trust;
consumers are not irrational for finding official assertions less than
comforting.171
EU policies also assume that purchasers can legitimately reflect social
values in their decisions. When asked why they do not prefer various food
technologies, EU consumers do not hesitate to say that they want to preserve
the livelihoods of their farmers, or preserve biodiversity, or reduce pesticide
use on their land-the kinds of value judgments that are not directly related
to the safety of the food itself.172
b. Where They Come From
i. Economic Investments
Commentators suggest several reasons for these divergent
assumptions: (1) economic investments, (2) market assumptions, and (3)
industry power. 73 The U.S. invests significant resources into developing
new technologies, including their applications to food. The government
provides tax incentives for research and development,' 74 grants funds for the
development of specific technologies,1 75 and develops technologies for
170. Consumer Empowerment, supra note 102, at 16.
171. Id. at 6.
172. See EUROBAROMETER, supra note 91, at 18.
173. At least one commentator assesses U.S./EU differences in GE plant regulation as
ultimately dependent on consumer preference and only peripherally connected to
production commitments, attitudes toward mass production, and centers of political
power. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012). This
analysis, however, ignores the low level of actual US consumer awareness. See NPD
GROUP, Over Half of U.S. Consumers Are Concerned About Genetically-Modified
Foods, But the Definition of GMOs Is Unclear Among Consumers, REPORTS NPD (Dec.
19, 2013), http://www.foodproductdesign.com/news/2013/12/gmo-concerns-steadily-
grow-among-consumers.aspx.
174. See generally Jonathan Talley, The Research and Development Tax Credit:
Moderately Effective but Hampered by Politics, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 77 (2011)
(discussing U.S. R&D tax credits, which began in 1981).
175. See U.S. Government Grants, About Us, TECHNOLOGY GRANTS, http://us-
government-grants.net/technology-grants (last accessed Dec. 22, 2013) (noting that for-
profit corporations may receive grants if they are "conducting research" or "creating
jobs").
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military use that are then commercialized.' 76 In contrast, the EU incentives
for R&D have been criticized as too low 7 7 and have been re-evaluated over
the past ten years. 178 By the time a given technology is ready to market, both
the U.S. government and industry have already committed significant
resources. It stands to reason that they would look for the broadest market
possible, while the EU would not experience the same loss by preserving
their status quo.
ii. Market Assumptions
U.S. regulators and judges tend to encourage developments in food
technologies. 79 Innovation appears to promise increased consumer choice
and decreased cost, as well as quality improvement.1"0 This optimism seems
to assume that any negative effects will be visible enough that the industry
will have motivation to correct itself. It seems to further assume that any
176. See Dana Nicolau, Innovation and Knowledge Transfer in Emerging Fields: The
Case of Nanotechnology in Australia, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 384, 392 (2005)
("[T]he military market provided an important springboard for small companies in
electronics and computers, and, later, in biotechnology."); James P. Chandler, The Loss
of New Technology to Foreign Competitors: U.S. Companies Must Search for Protective
Solutions, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 305, 308 (1994) ("For the past 50 years,
the major stimulus for U.S. technology research and development has been the design,
development and production of weapons and space systems. Many commercial products
today are the result of technologies developed for defense applications.").
177. See Simon Tilford, Is EU Competition Policy an Obstacle to Innovation &
Growth?, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM (Nov. 2008),
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/201 1/essaycom
petition st 20novO8-1359.pdf.
178. Placing Taxation at the Service of Research and Development, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/taxation/131047_en.htm (last updated Feb. 8,
2007).
179. See generally Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation In The European Union
And The United States: Different Cultures, Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525
(1998) (concluding that, "the U.S. regulatory approach doubts the safety of many
traditional foods but embraces new technologies like genetic engineering and
irradiation.").
180. This attitude appeared as early as the 1930s, when a court evaluated Bred Spred,
a new product that looked like jam but contained very little fruit. Though consumers had
no indication of this difference other than the absence of the word "jam" on the jar, the
court refused to find the product misbranded, adulterated, inferior, or even an imitation
of jam. See United States v. Ten Cases, More or Less, Bred Spred, Etc., 49 F.2d 87 (8th
Cir. 1931) ("There is nothing harmful or deleterious in the product Bred Spred. It has
some food value and some nutritive value."). See also MEREDITH A. HICKMAN, THE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 36 (2004).
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damage caused will be readily identifiable and reversible--or at least that
companies involved will be held responsible.
The EU embraces technical innovations in food more cautiously.18" '
While they were originally more liberal in adopting hormones and GE crops,
the EU reacted to unforeseen consequences by moving more cautiously
thereafter. EU consumer education program materials suggest market
liberalism is inevitable, leaving the government unable to implement all the
restrictions it may see as valuable. Informing consumers becomes the new
mechanism for protecting them, and relies on a view of the consumer as
active in shaping the market, rather than as passively receiving from it.
iii. Industry Power
Assumptions about consumers' lack of sophistication in the U.S. mirror
industry arguments that those who do not embrace their technologies are
"rogue anti-technology campaigners""' or "cynical . . . scare
campaign[ers]."' 83 This perspective bleeds into government because the
same people who work for the biotech and pharmaceutical companies behind
the technologies take up positions of power in agencies like the USDA and
FDA."'84 These individuals often move to the private sector, leading to what
some see as the industry becoming its own de facto regulator. While there is
a vigorous debate over whether this "revolving door" produces inappropriate
bias, there is no debate over its existence. 
85
181. See Echols, supra note 179, at 543 ("These influences in the EC tend to result in
laws that accept the safety of traditional foods and production processes, like that for raw
milk cheeses, but hesitate in the face of new technologies and novel foods."); Heidi
Moore, The US-EU Trade Deal Could Take Monsanto 's GM Crops off the Table,
GUARDIAN (May 15, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/i 5/us-eu-trade-deal-monsanto-
crops.
182. John Entine, Exposing the Anti-GMO Legal Machine: The Real Story Behind the
So-Called Monsanto Protection Act, FORBES (April 2, 2013, 5:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/j onentine/2013/04/02/exposing-the-anti-gmo-legal-
machine-the-real-story-behind-the-so-called-monsanto-protection-act/.
183. Henry 1. Miller & Jeff Stier, Mandatory Labeling Of Genetically Engineered
Foods Deserves A Warning Label Of Its Own, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/2013/10/09/mandatory-labeling-of-
genetically-engineered-foods-deserves-a-waming-label-of-its-own/.
184. See, e.g., Judy Saransohn, Under Bush, the Revolving Door Gains Speed,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/26/AR2005102602454.html.
185. See generally Jason luliano, Killing Us Sweetly: How to Take Industry out of the
FDA, 6 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 31, 84-5 (2010) (discussing the approval process of artificial
sweeteners as evidence of the conflicts of interest guiding high level FDA decisions),
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The government-industry partnership in the U.S. begins early in almost
any technology's development; many spring from academic-industrial
partnerships, which attract government funding.'86 In addition to alleged
agency capture, biotech and pharmaceutical industries-the main producers
of controversial food innovations-also wield immense political and
academic influence. 87 A recent Lancet study found multinational food
corporations, many U.S. based, use tactics similar to the tobacco industry in
order to undermine health policies and circumvent regulation. 18 8 Examples
of these tactics include producing biased research, diverting health
professionals and policy makers to promote their products, lobbying against
regulations, promoting individual votes against regulations, and deflecting
David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 548-
9 (2013) (concluding the crossover between public agency and private industry
employees is not a touchstone of corruption, but that bureaucrats have incentives to do
their regulatory jobs well to preserve their reputations, among other reasons); Elizabeth
R. Glod6, Advising Under the Influence?: Conflicts of Interest Among FDA Advisory
Committee Members, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 293, 321-2 (2002) (concluding that the FDA
must re-evaluate its conflict of interest criteria); James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription
Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food
and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 261, 338 (2005) (asserting that the
FDA does not have the needed independence from the industry).
186. See Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflict Of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical
Frontier, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 151 (2001) (discussing 1980s Bayh-Dole Act and its
incentives for academic-industrial partnerships, which some claim are responsible for the
rise of biotechnology); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Mar. 1, 2000, 12:00 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/03/the-kept-
university/306629/?singlepage=true.
187. See Interview by Steven M. Sellers with Jerome Kassirer, MONEY & MEDICINE,
Trial 34 (June 2012) ("1 do worry a lot about ghostwriting [i.e., articles written by
industry representatives but bylined by physicians], much more than I did when I was
the editor [of the New England Journal of Medicine] .... And it's not just ghostwriting
of review articles; it's even ghostwriting of clinical trials."); W. John Thomas, The Vioxx
Story: Would It Have Ended Differently In The European Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED.
365, 376 (2006) ("[T]he pharmaceutical industry has the largest lobbying organization
in Washington."); Bradford, supra note 173, at 32 ("Biotechnology is seen as a key for
retaining the U.S. competitiveness in export markets .... Consequently, U.S. farmers
and the entire biotechnology industry are influential players in the U.S. political
process.") (internal citations omitted); Nicola Lucchi, Governing Control over Human
Genetic Resources: Promises and Risks, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 254, 254-55 (noting the use
of biotechnology in developing new pharmaceuticals).
188. Rob Moodie et al., Profits and Pandemics: Prevention of Harmful Effects of
Tobacco, Alcohol, and Ultra-Processed Food and Drink Industries, LANCET, Feb. 12,
2013, at 670, available at
http://www.fsp.usp.br/site/dcms/fck/MonteiroLancetProfits%20and%20Pandemics-
1.pdf.
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attention from the health of their products by engaging primarily in unrelated
philanthropic arenas.
89
In the U.S., consumers are implicitly told to leave safety concerns to
the FDA, despite the fact that the FDA process has little pre-market power
to address long-term health implications. This leaves consumers vulnerable,
as shown by the recent action against trans-fats. 9 ' Artificial trans-fats
entered the U.S. food supply in the 1950s, and caused significant scientific
alarm in the 1980s, but industry pressures have delayed meaningful FDA
action until 2013.191 Perhaps tellingly, food industry arguments in the EU
reflect their government's opposing assumptions. Biotech trade
representatives use these arguments to claim, as it relates to Europeans,
"There is no evidence that opposition to GM food is a manifestation of a
wider disenchantment with science and technology in general." 192 This effort
to engage consumer approval directly seems to stem from the industry's
sense of its lack of political clout in the EU.
C. Nanotechnology Applications to Food
It is in this convoluted food regulatory space that nanotechnology is
beginning to come into its own. The concept of manipulating atoms on an
extremely small scale has existed since at least the late 1950s, and throughout
its ensuing development commentators encouraged tailored and cautious
regulatory responses.193 However, most consumers remain unaware of this
developing technology, much less that over 1,600 products on the market
include nano-materials.'
94
189. Id. at 673-4.
190. Kristin Wartman, Trans Fats: Deadly Consequences of FDA Inaction, CIVIL EATS
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://civileats.com/2013/11/20/trans-fat-travails/.
191. Id.
192. George Gaskell et al., EUROPEANS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY IN 2005: PATTERNS AND
TRENDS, EUROBAROMETER 64.3 May 2006, at 3, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2006/pdf/pr1906 eb 64 3 final report-
may2006 en.pdf; What do European Consumers Really Think about GM Foods?,
EUROPABIO,
http://www.europabio.org/sites/default/files/facts/what-do european-consumersreally
-think about gmfoods.pdf (last accessed Dec. 23, 2013) (arguing that consumers
should be given more opportunities to choose between GE and non-GE foods, with
increased information being made available).
193. Stokes, supra note 7, at 180-8 1.
194. See Brita Belli, Eating Nano, E MAG. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.emagazine.com/magazine/eating-nano ("[E] ach of us likely consumes some
amount of titanium dioxide (TiO2) nanoparticles each day, and children under 10 likely
consume the greatest amounts ... due to their higher intake of frosted foods, candy, gum
and other sweets"); see also Stokes, supra note 7; Press Release, WILSON CTR., Inventory
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Nanoparticles are materials that are microscopic-
significantly smaller than a red blood cell; and tens of
thousands of times smaller than the width of a human hair.
These particles can help deliver nutrients, ensure longer
freshness of food, act as thickening agents or enhance taste
or flavor. The problem is, scientists are still determining the
health and environmental impact of these tiny particles,
even as industry is forging ahead. 95
The web of standards that may be imposed on developing technologies
makes application of current measures to nanotechnology uncertain.
Additionally, the growing global sense of consumers distrust of the food
industry and of regulatory bodies suggests that new food technology should
inspire new approaches to their development and regulation.
While the majority of consumer nanotech applications relate to durable
consumer goods, many relate to food. One example is nano-sized titanium
dioxide, which is present in "many processed foods, including Mentos,
Trident and Dentyne gum, M&Ms, Betty Crocker Whipped Cream Frosting,
Jello Banana Cream Pudding, Vanilla Milkshake Pop Tarts and Nestl6
Original Coffee Creamer."' 96 While some nano-sized materials exist in
nature (like viruses, some milk proteins, and caramelized foods),
nanotechnology enables the production and manipulation of materials not
originally present in nano form.197 While the chemical composition is the
same, materials produced at nanoscale increase in surface area, which can
increase reactivity and result in different properties than their conventional
counterparts.198 For instance, some opaque materials are transparent at
Finds Increase in Consumer Products Containing Nanoscale Materials (Oct. 23, 2014),
available at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/9241/nano oct 2013_finalver.pdf
; Andy Behar, Study the Use of Nanoparticles in Food, CNN (Feb., 14, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/14/opinion/behar-food-nanoparticles/.
195. Belli, supra note 194.
196. Twilight Greenaway, Nanoparticles in Your Food? You 're Already Eating Them,
GRIST (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:40 AM), http://grist.org/food/nanoparticles-in-your-food-youre-
already-eating-them/. Food applications of nanotechnology are often discussed in the
following categories: (1) packaging, (2) cookware, (3) supplements, and (4) in foods
themselves. Jill Richardson, Meet the Four Categories of Nanofoods, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS ( Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/11/meet-the-four-
categories-of-nanofoods/.
197. Greenaway, supra note 196.
198. What is it & How it Works, NANO.GOv, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what
(last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
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nanoscale; some materials that normally would be excreted after ingestion
can migrate into various tissues at nanoscale and accumulate; some materials
simply have a different texture or are lighter.'99 These different properties
are precisely the reason they are being developed.00 In fact, the United States
government has allocated almost $21 billion to nanotechnology research.
2 1
Like genetic engineering, nanotechnology has significant potential
across the food and agriculture spectrum:
Nanotechnologies are expected to contribute to materials
with better, for instance[,] antimicrobial properties; and to
"smart" packaging using sensors to indicate food
spoilage. . . . Nanotechnologies are expected to enable
encapsulation devices which protect sensitive food
ingredients, improve their solubility and mask unpleasant
tastes. They enable processing technologies such as particle
stabilized emulsions which can contribute to novel food
structures which have novel "mouth sensations."
Nanotechnologies may contribute to highly sensitive sensor
technologies to detect food pathogens and may be used to
monitor crop growth.2 °2
Many of these potential benefits could accrue to consumers directly in the
form of superior products, whether in terms of nutrition, safety, or simply a
new food experience. Further, food packaging developed with
nanotechnology may significantly reduce food waste, helping to address
world hunger.
Discussion of nanotechnology regulation has stalled based on industry
apprehension that consumers are opposed to technology applications to food,
or "concerns about concerns. 203 Food made with nanotechnology does raise
199. Nanocomposites, NANOSONIC (2011),
http://www.nanosonic.com/29/nanocomposites.html.
200. Frequently Asked Questions, NANO.GOv, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-
101/nanotechnology-facts (last accessed Dec. 23, 2013).
201. Id. According to a 2011 report, the US leads worldwide nanotech research, with
Russia and China close behind. Global Funding of Nanotechnologies & its Impact,
CIENTIFICA (July 2011),
http://cientifica.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Global-Nanotechnology-
Funding-Report-2011 .pdf.
202. Haico te Kulve et al, Context Matters: Promises and Concerns Regarding
Nanotechnologies for Water and Food Applications, 7 NANOETHICS 17, 22 (2013)
(internal citations omitted).
203. Id. at 22, 23 (noting that such concerns are "largely about the perceptions by
advocates of nanotechnologies (such as industry) about possible negative perceptions of
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health and safety concerns, and some question the magnitude of the actual
benefits:
[P]ossible health and safety issues includ[e], for example,
the possible migration of nanomaterials in food packaging
or possible toxic effects of nanoparticles used to improve
taste or the nutritional value of food products. Occasionally
other issues are mentioned, such as possible environmental
impacts of nanomaterials, i.e. impacts of disposed
nanomaterials. In addition, some voices do not refer directly
or indirectly to health or environmental risks, but are
skeptical about the performance of future products and their
economic feasibility.20
4
Assessing these concerns presents additional difficulty because of the
breadth of nanotechnology: engineered nanomaterials comprise a broad
category, with wide-ranging potential concerns and possibilities. One
engineered nano-material may be quite harmful, while another completely
benign. Informed citizens cite several concerns reminiscent of other
technologies discussed: long-term health effects, environmental
repercussions, how the technology's development is controlled, and how
risks would be assessed and distributed. 25 These concerns do not reflect anti-
technology sentiment. In fact, consumers polled were more interested in
nanotechnology in food than in GE technology in food, but still wanted more
transparency. 20 6 They cite what they saw as past failures of regulators to take
into account their interests (e.g., BSE, asbestos, Agent Orange) as an impetus
for such concerns.207
Many nanotechnology commentators have discussed the lack of
consumer engagement and transparency by industry promoters of GE foods
as a pitfall to be avoided with the introduction of nanotechnology.
2°
However, industry proponents and governments have largely ignored this
insight. In the mid-2000s, several countries-including the UK, U.S.,
consumers, so concerns about concems, rather than examining actual data of consumer
perceptions. Expectations about negative consumer responses are supposed to affect the
way how the food industry approaches nano-based applications, namely by keeping
silent about the respective activities.") (internal citations omitted).
204. te Kulve, supra note 202, at 23.
205. Georgia Miller, Nanotechnology and the Public Interest: Repeating the mistakes
of GMfoods?,7 INT'L J. TECH. TRANSFER & COMMERCIALIZATION 274, 275-76 (2008).
206. See generally id.
207. Id. at 276.
208. See id.
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France, and Germany--experimented with "public engagement exercises,"
but none connected to actual decision making.
209
Not only are nanotechnology developers refusing to identify and target
socially desirable developments, less than one half of one percent of
worldwide technology research funding goes to research of health and
environment risks. 210 Even among Swiss and German companies, which
serve some of the most eco-conscious consumers, new nanotechnologies are
rarely assessed for risk.211
Nanomaterials are effectively un-tracked and un-regulated in most of
the world. Despite vast development investments, no country has
implemented a nano-specific approval or regulatory regime." 2 As of the end
of 2014, the EU requires labeling of nanotech-enhanced food and
cosmetics.213 The still-developing science makes it unclear, though, exactly
how products will be regulated or which will be subject to approval under
the Novel Foods Regulation.214
In the U.S., no government body to date has developed requirements
for engineered nanomaterials. The FDA does not even track nanotech used
in food products. 215 The U.S. regulates nanotech materials just like their
209. Id. at 279.
210. Miller, supra note 205, at277.
211. Id. at278.
212. Several countries have disallowed engineered nanotech particles in foods labeled
"organic": Canada, UK, Austria, Australia. In the US, the Organic Crop Improvement
Association has banned nano in organics; while the National Organic Standards board
recommended in 2010 that nanotech be disallowed in organics, no final stance seems to
have been taken. NATIONAL ORGANIC STANDARDS BOARD, Formal Recommendation to
the National Organic Board, Oct. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl .0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5087795; Canada
Bans Nanotechnology in Organics, ORGANIC & NON-GMO REPORT (May 2010),
http://www.non-gmoreport.com/articles/may I 0/canada-bans-nanotechnology-
organics.php.
213. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, & the European Economic & Social Committee on the Second Regulatory
Review on Nanomaterials, COM (2012) 288 final (Oct. 3, 2012); see also Nicola Barrett,
European Union Regulation of Nanotechnology in the Food Industry, 8
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 252 (2012).
214. See generally Daniela Marrani, Nanotechnologies and Novel Foods in European
Law, 7 NANOETHICS 177 (2013) (noting the EU's incremental regulatory approach,
which subjects nanomaterials to the same kinds of rules as other products unless new
risks are found to require different rules, as well as the lack of international agreement
on definitions and risk assessments, which may lead to trade disputes).
215. Belli, supra note 194 ("Following is a recent email exchange with Sebastian
Cianci, a spokesperson at the FDA: E Magazine: What can you tell me about the
prevalence of nanomaterials in our food supply? Sebastian Cianci: FDA does not have a
list of food products that contain nanomaterials. E: Where are nanomaterials most often
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larger counterparts, unless the manufacturer voluntarily identifies a material
difference.2"6 Despite repeated assertions that public information and
engagement will encourage development of nanotechnology, governments
and industry are largely ignoring the so-called lessons of the GE food
controversies.217 Efforts by public interest groups to this end have met with
failure,218  and consumer information regarding nanotechnology
developments has actually been declining.2 19 Retailers have similarly failed
to demand life-cycle safety or environmental impact studies. Experiences
with genetic engineering and other technologies seem to have brought
discussion of nanotech in food to a standstill.
III. A NEW MODEL FOR CONSUMER ENGAGEMENT
IN DEVELOPING FOOD TECHNOLOGIES
A. Responses to Current Assumptions
1. United States
While U.S. consumers are expected to accept goods that meet
minimum safety standards due to an inability to adequately evaluate
additional issues,2 2 ° this paper has shown this approach is lacking. Widely-
found within food products? In colorings or additives? S.C.: FDA does not maintain a
list of food products that contain nanomaterials so we cannot reliably answer this
question.").
216. FDA, Guidance for Industry, 2014 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION
4, 5 ("As with all food substances, this guidance also is intended to recommend that you
consult with us regarding a significant change in manufacturing process for a food
substance already in the market, irrespective of your conclusion about whether that
change affects the safety or regulatory status of the food substance. It is prudent practice
for you to do so, particularly when the change in manufacturing process involves
emerging technology .... The consequences (to consumers and to the food industry) of
broadly distributing a food substance that is later recognized to present a safety concern
have the potential to be significant.")
217. Miller, supra 205, at 277 (2008); see, e.g., Carla Almeida, Brazil Struggles to
Regulate Emerging Nanotechnology, SCIDEVNET (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://www.scidev.net/global/technology/feature/brazil-struggles-to-regulate-emerging-
nanotechnology.html.
218. For example, in 2006, a coalition of consumer and environmental groups
petitioned the FDA for labeling and testing of new nano-enhanced products. In 2011, it
sued for a response to the petition. Complaint at 2, International Center for Technology
Assessment et al., v. Hamburg, Docket No. 3:11 -cv-06592 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
219. Caroline Scott-Thomas, Consumers Less Aware of Nanotech as Media Coverage
Falls, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-
Industry/Consumers-less-aware-of-nanotech-as-media-coverage-falls.
220. See generally Wartman, supra note 190; Heinzerling, supra note 47.
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cited risk-communication expert David Ropeike, diagnoses this situation as
the "malady of Fear of Fear," noting that, contrary to popular belief,
Choice makes risks feel voluntary. It makes us feel
empowered, more in control of our health and safety, and
that makes any risk feel less scary. Time and time again,
when people are given choice-as labeling would do-their
fears are reduced and they engage in risks they fight tooth
and nail when the risk feels imposed.221
Unnecessarily restricting consumer decision-making by excluding
information is counterproductive. It encourages skepticism and distrust.
Assumptions of consumer unwillingness or inability to engage in calculated
risks also hamper consumer efforts to make choices that implement their
social or ethical values.222 This "lowest common denominator" approach can
also mislead by portraying food choices as black and white, safe or unsafe,
resulting in consumer inaction, due perhaps to a false sense of security or
bystander apathy.223
Finally, focusing developments in the food industry on patented or
patentable technologies may not be beneficial from a consumer standpoint.
A frequent claim arises: granting and protecting government-granted
monopolies (i.e., patents on crops or other food-related technologies) is the
only way to promote innovations that will address consumer tastes and
market needs, like increased production to meet growing world nutrition
demands. However, this claim may prove unsubstantiated if empirically
analyzed.
224
221. David Ropeik, GMO Labeling: An Open Letter to BigAgTech CEOs, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 6, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-ropeik/gmo-
labelingb 4224023.html.
222. See, e.g., Dorothy Du, Note, Rethinking Risks: Should Socioeconomic and Ethical
Considerations be Incorporated into the Regulation of Genetically Modified Crops?, 26
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 76 (2012).
223. See Wartman, supra note 190; Heinzerling, supra note 47(discussions of trans fats
and antibiotic resistance); see also Alison Peck, Does Regulation Chill Democratic
Deliberation? The Case of GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 685 (2013).
224. See Emily Marden & R. Nelson Godfrey, Intellectual Property and Sharing
Regimes in Agricultural Genomics: Finding the Right Balance for Innovation, 17 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 369, 391 (2012) ("[B]oth regimes that grant [P and those that mandate the
sharing of such resources are necessary for continued innovation in the agricultural
genomics space .... The collective impact on innovators by these fragmented and
complex regimes has not been conclusively documented and remains difficult to unravel
for developers and academic commentators alike."). For an overview of plant patent
history, seed market consolidation, and reduction in biodiversity, and other issues related
to plant patents, see Allyson Martin, Seed Savers v. Monsanto: Farmers Need a Victory
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2. European Union
While the EU seems to operate from a different starting point than the
U.S., saddling consumers with the responsibility to implement social choices
through their individual choices brings its own set of concerns. First, labeling
alone may not be enough to facilitate an informed decision. For instance, a
consumer may see "made with Nanotechnology" but not know how that
information should be used. A recent pamphlet from an EU biotech trade
organization, EuropaBio, noted that consumers may be interested in
purchasing technologically enhanced food products with additional
information, such as whether the technology resulted in lower pesticide
residue, or involved a more environmentally friendly process.225
Second, a consumer may lack superior options or feel inundated with
so many important choices that she may become overwhelmed rather than
empowered. Alternatively, consumers may feel satisfied with doing the best
they can even when that "best" is bounded by production and distribution
mechanisms that conflict with their values. Some academics discuss this
phenomenon as a growing "consumer burden" resulting from liberal trade
and regulatory policies.22 6 This suggests that even the EU's aggressive
education plans may not assure consumers a meaningful way to enact their
social values or make purchases consistent with their ethical concerns.
3. How to Think about Consumers
Consumers can react viscerally when they feel information has been
deliberately hidden from them, even if they would have accepted the change
with an adequate up-front explanation. These considerations suggest that
industry and government should shift to thinking of consumers as true
stakeholders rather than simply purchasers and digesters of products.
for Wilting Biodiversity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 95 (2013). A
research project by the National Bureau of Economic Research concluded that plant
patents may in fact result in market concentration and uniformity of available varieties,
using rose plants as a case study. Petra Moser and Paul W. Rhode, Did Plant Patents
Create the American Rose? in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY
REVISITED 413 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stem, eds., 2012).
225. EUROPEAN ASSOC. FOR BIOINDUSTRIES, What do European Consumers Really
Think about GM Foods?, EUROPABIO,
http://www.europabio.org/sites/default/files/facts/what do european consumersreally
-think aboutgm foods.pdf (last accessed May 22, 2014).
226. See, e.g., CONFRONTING CONSUMPTION (Thomas Princen et al., eds., 2002); JULIE
GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM
(2011).
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Nutritional science has been and still is developing its understanding of the
significant connection between food and health, so consumers often find the
old adage, "you are what you eat" still resonates with them. Thus, access to
information about and control over food choices becomes ever more
important to consumers. Consumers have exhibited heightened awareness of
food sensitivities and allergies, as well as the environmental impacts of their
food choices. Many with the means and time to do so have made efforts to
opt out of the current food system in the U.S. (e.g., growing popularity of
farmers markets; growth in sales of Organic, Fair Trade, and Kosher labeled
foods). These shifts indicate a public that feels it deserves to see how it would
be benefitted by new developments.
B. Mechanisms for Forward Motion
The current U.S. approach to food technologies has been largely ad hoc
and has resulted in consumer uncertainty and distrust. Some may say that
these developing technologies are all so different from each other that no
adequate alternative exists. Regardless of the diversity of concerns or
technologies at issue, however, keeping in mind Ropeike's assessment of
risk may prove instructive. 27 He claims that sound decisions regarding new,
evolving, or difficult-to-characterize risks demand accurate and careful
communication of the magnitude of the risks as best understood, even if they
are uncertain."'
Industry actors can respond to consumer discontent by making their
cases for the use of new technologies in foods, showing that the technologies
are not benefitting companies at the expense of consumer values. Regulators
can insist on sharing information and facilitate meaningful consumer input.
Food-applicable technologies will only develop and proliferate, and
government and industry actors may be able to address this by adopting
proactive, communicative regimes for development and regulation of new
technologies used in food. These regimes should involve both information
communicated to consumers and facilitation of meaningful consumer input.
Descriptions of several suggested components follow.
227. George M. Gray and David P. Ropeik, Dealing With The Dangers Of Fear: The
Role Of Risk Communication, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at 106, 115.
228. Id.
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
1. Invigorate GRAS Implementation by Enabling Pre-Market Notice and
Review
While pharmaceutical products must pass pre-market FDA review,
food products are not generally subject to such scrutiny. However, in 1958
Congress responded to consumer concerns regarding increased additive use
in foods by enacting the Food Additives Amendment.229 It requires approval
of "substances used in packaging, transport, processing, preparation, and
other processes that might either affect or migrate into food." 23 Some
commentators argue that GRAS, one of the exceptions to this rule, has made
the rule all but ineffective.
A substance is GRAS if "generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate [their] safety...
to be safe under the conditions of [their] intended use." '231 The FDA has
implemented GRAS using various procedures since its enactment, but
currently a food producer who wishes to assert that an additive is GRAS is
not even required to alert the FDA-the process is voluntary.232 This means
that new additives, whether used in the food, its packaging, or elsewhere,
may not even be on the FDA's radar, much less approved for use or evaluated
according to the statutory exception's requirements.
While the FDA began a comprehensive review of GRAS substances in
1970, this halted due to lack of resources.233 Now the FDA reviews GRAS
substances only when specific issues are raised.234 With some food additive
petitions taking over a decade to complete the petition process, food
companies have every incentive to identify an additive as GRAS if any
argument can be made that it meets this vague standard. Facing possible
penalties down the road can make much more business sense than submitting
to an uncertain approval process that can take over half of the patent
length.235 Mitigating or removing this perverse incentive should be a primary
goal of food system reform. Requiring mandatory pre-market notice and
publication of claimed GRAS status seems to be a reasonable start.236 Even
229. Laurie J. Beyranevand, Generally Recognized As Safe?: Analyzing Flaws in the
FDA 's Approach to GRAS Additives, 37 VT. L. REV. 887, 894 (2013).
230. Id.
231. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012).
232. Beyranevand, supra note 133, at 906.
233. Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 449 (2008).
234. Id.
235. Peter Barton Hutt, Regulation of Food Additives in the United States, in FOOD
ADDITIVES 199, 205 (A. Larry Branen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
236. As a corollary, the food additive approval process may also require reform to
become a viable option.
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a published notice requirement would provide a foothold for consumer
awareness and response.
2. Labeling New Technologies is a Minimum Threshold
Foods containing, processed with, or packaged using new technologies
should be labeled in order to facilitate consumer awareness and traceability
in the case of unforeseen consequences. Those who oppose increased
labeling requirements argue that required information labels can become de
facto warning labels, which may cause unwarranted negative responses. On
the other side, voluntary labeling statements have caused just as much, if not
more, confusion to consumers. Consumers make purchases based on the
information available to them regarding safety, nutrition, and environmental
and ethical concerns. This is the case even if that information is unregulated
or implied, and very few consumers are aware of which statements are
regulated, which are not, and just what that means for their reliability.237 The
case of industrialized egg production provides a salient illustration:
[M]any consumers are paying premiums for eggs adorned
with images of farms without knowing what those
illustrations mean. Other consumers are declining to pay for
eggs with superior nutritional or safety qualities because
they do not have enough information about how eggs are
produced to know that those added qualities are important,
or they do not trust that labeling indicating those qualities is
truthful. Thus, there is a breakdown in the relationship
between consumer preference and the types of eggs
consumers ultimately choose. Such a breakdown indicates a
market failure, because egg prices are not reflecting actual
demand for food qualities, such as increased nutrient
content. Indeed, one may conclude that there is a lower
supply of high-quality food products (e.g., cage-free or free-
range eggs) than there would be if this information
asymmetry were remedied.
238
Without labeling new technologies, packaging implies that the contents are
what they always have been in the past, creating misinformation through
237. See FDA, What is the Meaning of "Natural" on the Label of Food?, supra note
121.
238. Aurora Paulsen, Catching Sight of Credence Attributes: Compelling Production
Method Disclosures on Eggs, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 280, 317 (2011).
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silence and assumptions or through provision of selective information. 239
Ideally, a labeling scheme would involve not just a notation about the new
technology, but also assess its environmental or health impact, or note the
lack of available information, with additional detail available in an online
database or agency publication.24°
3. Facilitate Pre-Market Consumer Input through Consultant Boards
Providing the information consumers need to make informed choices
about their food requires knowing what kind of information consumers look
for when they make purchases, and what their priorities are. It also requires
balancing those interests with regulatory resources, research priorities, and
industry needs. Consumer representative groups-similar to the ECCG-
should be created and required to consult on labeling regimes and regulations
regarding new technologies. Involving an independent board in this arena is
an ideal way to balance the concerns of the industry for privacy and the need
for consumer input-the members of the consultant board can easily abide
by non-disclosure agreements when needed.
An additional and perhaps even more crucial arena for consumer
involvement seems to be in allocating research funding.241  The U.S.
government directs substantial funds to directly and indirectly subsidize
technology development; engaging consumer input regarding the social
utility of funded projects could result in more efficient use of funds and a
239. For a detailed discussion of the potential for food labels to facilitate consumer
choice, including health, environmental, and ethical issues, see J.C. Horvath, How Can
Better Food Labels Contribute To True Choice?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCi. & TECH. 359 (2012)
(this issue also dovetails with discussions regarding mandatory front of pack labeling
limitations).
240. The EWG cosmetic rating system is a relatively easy to use and informative
format that may present a helpful model for noting new food technologies and
communicating risk in a helpful way. It rates each ingredient and product on two levels:
hazard, and data availability. EWG's SKIN DEEP DATABASE COSMETICS DATABASE,
http://www.ewg.org/skindeep/faq/ (last accessed May 22, 2014). Hazard is rated from 0
to 10 and data availability is rated on five levels - ranging from "none" to "robust." Id.
Data availability is reflected by the color that serves as a background to the hazard rating.
Id.
241. See, e.g., European Commission Services, Towards Responsible Research and
Innovation in the Information and Communication Technologies and Security
Technologies Fields, 2011 EURPOEAN RESEARCH, SCI. IN SOC'Y 10 ("In order to
anticipate positive and negative impacts or, whenever possible, define desirable impacts
of research and innovation both in terms of impact on consumers and communities.
Setting of research priorities with their anticipated impacts needs to be subject to a
societal review. This implies broadening the review of research proposals beyond
scientific excellence and includes societal impacts.").
[VOL. 10
2014] LET'S STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE TRANSPARENCY 277
stimulation of research that would result in new food products responding
directly to consumer needs or concerns. European studies looking at how to
assess technology have already been conducted and could inform U.S.
efforts.242
4. Reconsider International Trade Policies on Food Technologies
Agriculture and food-related intellectual property ("IP") issues have
formed some of the most contested areas in current trade agreement
negotiations. With WTO stagnation came an emphasis on bilateral
agreements as the primary vehicle by which powerful trading entities like
the U.S. and EU implement increased IP protections.2 43 The U.S. is now
negotiating two massive trade agreements: Trans Pacific Partnership
("TPP") and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") /
Transatlantic Free Trade Area ("TAFTA"). 2' These negotiations involve
non-tariff barriers, which some fear will include bargaining away regulations
and standards that consumers view as protections.2 45 Domestic consumer
organizations claim that leaked negotiation materials show TAFTA
negotiations include efforts by each party to weaken protections.2 46 Similar
concerns were anticipated regarding TPP, whose chief agricultural
negotiator is a former lobbyist for pesticide and agribusiness firms.2 47
242. See, e.g., BRIDGES BETWEEN SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND POLICY (Michael Decker and
Miltos Ladikas eds., 2004).
243. See Kaitlin Mara, Stronger IP Enforcement Finds A Home In Bilateral Trade
Agreements, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (APRIL 21, 2009, 12:09 PM),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2009/04/21/stronger-ip-enforcement-finds-home-in-bilateral-,
trade-agreements/.
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While international trade is perhaps the most inaccessible forum for
consumers, it is arguably the most influential and should be a priority in any
effort to address consumer concerns. International trade negotiations are
anything but transparent, and some see them as a way for government and
industry to enact rules that would never appeal to the public but present a
potential profit opportunity.248 These negotiations can include trade lobbyists
but rarely involve consumer representatives or even Senators.249To remedy
this imbalance a consumer group should be included anywhere industry
lobbyists are included.
IV. CONCLUSION
Through this discussion of current trends and potential improvements
to involving consumers in the development of food technologies, a
significant disconnect has emerged. U.S. food technology policies operate
on a largely voluntary basis in the ostensible belief that market forces will
adequately safeguard consumers. However, this review has shown that
industry actors continue to advance legal actions, lobbying campaigns, and
initiatives that seek to expand their ability to avoid market downsides, to in
effect alter the market. This should come as no great surprise, as 78% of
surveyed managers admit that steady earnings from quarter to quarter and
year to year are their primary motivation, even at the risk of long-term
negative consequences.25 ° It also underscores the importance of establishing
institutions and processes that will involve consumer voices and values in
the development of new technology applications to food.
Many commentators see consumer preference as an opposing force to
technology in the food system. Discussions often focus on a specific issue,
such as constitutional rights, then analyze whether consumers or industry
have, or should have, the upper hand in that isolated context. However, as
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Partnership (TPP): Fast Track to a Gusher of Imported Fish, FOOD & WATER WATCH
(April 2014), http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/TPPImported Fish.pdf;
Fast-Tracking Corporate Power: Investor-State Dispute Resolution and the TPP, FOOD
& WATER WATCH (Jan. 2014),
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Fast TrackingCorporate Power.pdf.
248. David Brodwin, Op-Ed, Obama's Pacific Trade Deal Is No Deal At All, US NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT (April 19, 2013),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/04/19/trans-pacific-
partnership-strikes-a-blow-against-growth-and-sustainable-development.
249. Id.
250. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 1-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10550, 2004).
[VOL. 1 0
2014] LET'S STOP WORRYING AND LEARN TO LOVE TRANSPARENCY 279
it seems increasingly likely that engaging consumers will improve a
21company's bottom line.
Decisions in this arena should not, however, rely solely on market
vitality. While transparency brings benefits, they may be insufficient
motivation for some. Best efforts to be responsive to consumers in a world
of fast changing technologies must include mandatory measures
incorporating consumer input.
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